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INTRODUCTION 
In a recent case, the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia held that “liking” something on Facebook did not 
constitute speech for First Amendment purposes.1  The court ana-
lyzed Facebook’s “Like” feature in the context of a campaign for pub-
lic office.2  The court refused to even apply First Amendment scrutiny 
to an employee’s termination because of his “liking” the campaign 
web page of a candidate for sheriff who was running for office against 
the employee’s boss, the current sheriff.3  It found that a “Like” on 
Facebook did not amount to expression covered by the First 
Amendment.4  The district court’s decision was appealed to the Unit-
ed States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which reversed the 
lower court’s holding that “liking” a Facebook page was insufficient 
speech to merit constitutional protection.5 
The case generated quite a bit of public attention.6  Both the 
American Civil Liberties Union and Facebook itself filed amicus curi-
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Doctor, University of California at Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law, 2000; Bachelor of 
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 1 Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603 (E.D. Va. 2012) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and 
remanded, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 2 Id. at 603–04. 
 3 Id. at 601–04. 
 4 Id. at 603. 
 5 Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 384–86 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 6 See, e.g., Megan Garber, Is a Facebook Like Protected Under the First Amendment? A Court 
Says No, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 30, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2012/04/is-a-facebook-like-protected-under-the-first-amendment-a-
court-says-no/256534 (“[The district court’s] ruling is a strange ruling, particularly be-
cause a Facebook like, as simplisitic as it is, is nothing if not a ‘substantive statement.’”); 
Helen A.S. Popkin, Does Your Facebook ‘Like’ Count as Free Speech?, NBCNEWS.COM (May 2, 
2012, 6:39 PM), http://sys03-public.nbcnews.com/technology/does-your-facebook-count-
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ae briefs before the Fourth Circuit court.7  Both amici disagreed with 
the lower court’s opinion.8  Their arguments discussed in detail the 
issue of the communicative nature of the Facebook “Like” feature.9  
The Fourth Circuit court largely agreed with both amici.10 
The issues involved in the Bland litigation are certainly a worthy 
subject for a law review article in themselves.11  This is not that article.  
This Article, instead, although inspired in part by the holding in 
Bland, is a foray into the approach that courts have taken in the re-
cent past towards questions of First Amendment coverage in the con-
text of emerging technologies.  Specifically, this Article will take a 
closer look at how courts have dealt with the issue of functionality in 
the context of First Amendment coverage of computer source code.  
The analysis of this recent experience, when put in a larger context, 
reflects a continuing dissatisfaction on the part of both courts and 
legislatures with the current Supreme Court doctrine on First 
Amendment coverage.  Bland is just the latest, noteworthy example. 
 
free-speech-749433 (“According to the court’s opinion in Bland v. Roberts 2012, clicking 
the Facebook’s ‘Like’ button isn’t ‘sufficient speech to garner First Amendment protec-
tion.’”); Clicking ‘Like’ on Facebook Is Not Protected Speech, Judge Rules, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/us/clicking-like-on-facebook-is-not-
protected-speech-judge-rules.html?_r=0 (“The ‘like’ button on Facebook seems a relative-
ly clear way to express your support for something, but a federal judge says that does not 
mean clicking it is constitutionally protected speech.”). 
 7 See Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant Daniel Ray Carter, Jr., 
Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1671) (asserting that liking a page 
on Facebook is speech protected by the First Amendment); Brief for ACLU & ACLU of 
Virginia as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368 (4th Cir. 
2013) (No. 12-1671) (arguing that the Facebook “Like” feature should be protected un-
der the First Amendment). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Bland, 730 F.3d at 384–86. 
 11 See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Fringes of Free Expression:  Testing the Meaning of “Speech” Amid Shifting 
Cultural Mores & Changing Technologies, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 545, 571–80 (2013); 
Jacquelyn E. Fradette, Note, Online Terms of Service:  A Shield for First Amendment Scrutiny of 
Government Action, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 974 (2013); Leigh Ellen Gray, Thumb 
War: The Facebook “Like” Button and Free Speech in the Era of Social Networking, 7 CHARLESTON 
L. REV. 447, 480–85 (2013); Benjamin F. Jackson, Censorship and Freedom of Expression in the 
Age of Facebook, 44 N.M. L. REV. 121, 135-36 (2014); Molly D. McPartland, Note, An Analy-
sis of Facebook “Likes” and Other Nonverbal Internet Communication Under the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence, 99 IOWA L. REV. 445 (2013); Ira P. Robbins, What Is the Meaning of “Like”?: The First 
Amendment Implications of Social-Media Expression, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 127 (2013); Alicia D. 
Sklan, Note, @socialmedia:  Speech with a Click of a Button? #socialsharingbuttons, 32 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 377 (2013); Zachary Shklar, Note, Social Networking and 
Freedom of Speech: Not “Like” Old Times, 78 MO. L. REV. 665 (2013). 
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The First Amendment, of course, guarantees our freedom of 
speech.12  First Amendment coverage, then, refers to the threshold 
question of whether a particular regulation of human activity triggers 
analysis under the Free Speech Clause of the Constitution at all.  Ex-
tending First Amendment coverage over an activity means that “the 
constitutionality of the conduct’s regulation must be determined by 
reference to First Amendment doctrine and analysis.”13  “If, on the 
other hand, a particular activity is not covered by the First Amend-
ment, courts need not consult First Amendment doctrine to deter-
mine the constitutionality of its regulation.”14  Only after coverage has 
been established need we engage in First Amendment protection anal-
ysis. 
This second protection inquiry involves the actual application of 
the pertinent First Amendment scrutiny to the challenged regula-
tion.15  “At this [second] stage, courts should consider the govern-
ment interest being pursued through regulation and the fit between 
such ends and the means employed to achieve it.”16  “To say that an 
activity is ‘protected’ by the First Amendment from government regu-
lation means first that the activity is covered by the First Amendment 
and second that the regulation attempted by the government is un-
constitutional under First Amendment doctrine.”17 
In terms of textual constitutional analysis, the question we seek to 
answer when we address the preliminary question of coverage is 
whether a particular regulation of human activity falls within the 
scope of some specific constitutional provision. In the case of the 
Free Speech Clause, the operative constitutional text is, “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”18  Free 
 
 12 U.S. CONST., amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”). 
 13 Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 
714 (2000) [hereinafter Post, Encryption]. 
 14 Jorge R. Roig, Decoding First Amendment Coverage of Computer Source Code in the Age of 
YouTube, Facebook, and the Arab Spring, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 319, 328 (2012). 
 15 Id. at 330. 
 16 Id. (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (applying strict scrutiny and requiring 
“the State to show that the ‘regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and 
that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end’” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983))); see also Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. 
Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (applying an intermediate level of 
scrutiny and requiring that the State “assert a substantial interest to be achieved by re-
strictions on commercial speech” and that “the regulatory technique . . . be in proportion 
to that interest”). 
 17 Roig, supra note 14, at 328–29. 
 18 U.S. CONST., amend. I (emphasis added). 
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Speech Clause coverage, then, turns on how we define the word 
“speech.” The big question is:  What is speech? 
We can seek to answer this question at several different levels of 
analysis.  First, we could take a doctrinal approach and ask ourselves 
whether the Supreme Court would find that a particular activity is 
speech for First Amendment purposes.  As part of such an endeavor, 
of course, it is essential to try to understand and parse out how courts 
have addressed such questions in the past. 
Second, we could engage in a normative discussion of how the 
Supreme Court should resolve any such issues.  As part of such a nor-
mative approach, we might suggest alternative routes for the doctrine 
and gauge whether the current precedent is consistent with the best 
constitutional policy. 
Finally, such a normative discussion might expand to consider the 
bigger picture.  In this sense, a conscientious analysis of coverage is-
sues concerning the Free Speech Clause may very well shed light on a 
larger theory of constitutional coverage.  For every individual right 
guaranteed by the Constitution, similar questions of coverage arise.  
These questions of coverage have invariably resulted in great contro-
versy.  So, for example, much judicial ink has been devoted to deter-
mining what constitutes a “search” or a “seizure” for purposes of 
Fourth Amendment analysis.19  Similarly, the definition of “property,” 
as the term is used in different parts of the Constitution, has been the 
subject of much dispute.20  And many already expect robust litigation 
over the question of exactly what “arms” are covered by the newly 
recognized individual right to keep and bear arms under the Second 
Amendment.21  Furthermore, the role that emerging and evolving 
technologies have played, and will continue to play, in defining, rede-
 
 19 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (resolving that the government’s 
installation and prolonged use and monitoring of a Global Positioning System (GPS) 
tracking device on a suspect’s car is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment); Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that the use of a thermal imaging device from 
a public vantage point to detect radiation of heat from a suspect’s home is a “search” un-
der the Fourth Amendment). 
 20 See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, “Property” in the Constitution: The View From the Third Amendment, 20 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1243 (2012) (discussing the multiple and inconsistent meanings 
assigned to the term “property” throughout the Constitution). 
 21 See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 570 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment pro-
tects an individual’s right to possess a firearm for purposes of self-defense, after an exten-
sive discussion by the majority and dissenting opinions about the meaning of terms such 
as “keep and bear arms”); McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (holding 
that the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller is incorporated by the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and applies to the states). 
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fining, and refining these (and many other) individual rights is noth-
ing short of crucial.22 
This Article aims to explore the role that the issue of functionality 
has played in courts’ assessment of First Amendment coverage issues 
when reviewing regulation of computer source code.  It also expects 
to derive some meaningful normative insights regarding the interplay 
between such emerging technologies and First Amendment coverage 
doctrine.  Finally, this Article hopes to serve as a stepping stone in a 
more profound and long-term pursuit of a comprehensive theory of 
constitutional individual rights coverage issues that might serve us 
well as the future brings unexpected changes in our society. 
I. STRUGGLING TO FOLLOW THE SUPREME COURT’S LEAD 
From a purely doctrinal perspective, to someone familiar with 
First Amendment doctrine and Facebook, the district court’s holding 
in Bland might come as a bit of a surprise.  A relatively straightfor-
ward application of current Supreme Court precedent should make it 
pretty clear that “liking” something on Facebook is an activity whose 
regulation should trigger at least some level of First Amendment 
scrutiny.  But courts do make mistakes every so often.  After all, that is 
what we have courts of appeal for, right?  So, what may be even more 
surprising is all the hubbub surrounding the opinion.   Why is every-
one so concerned about this district court’s holding? 
The concern arises because it is not the first time, and it is likely 
not the last time, that courts, legislatures and government agencies 
have had trouble applying First Amendment coverage doctrine to 
new technologies or new forms of communication.  It seems to be a 
recurring problem. 
In Bland, the district court was unwilling to recognize any level of 
First Amendment scrutiny at all in the context of the use of the Face-
book “Like” feature during an election campaign.23  This result 
should be at least a bit surprising if we briefly consider the applica-
tion of Supreme Court doctrine in this context.  In Spence v. Washing-
ton, the Supreme Court held that an activity would be deemed com-
municative enough to merit First Amendment protection if it had 
“[a]n intent to convey a particularized message” and “in the sur-
 
 22 See supra notes 19 and 21 (referring to the pertinent cases concerning “search and sei-
zure” and “keep and bear arms”). 
 23 Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
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rounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message 
would be understood by those who viewed it.”24 
The Spence test, however, was modified in Hurley v. Irish-American 
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston.25   
In Hurley, the Court made clear that a particularized message is not re-
quired: “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of 
constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a 
‘particularized message’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded 
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabber-
wocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”26   
Furthermore, “[a]ccording to the traditional interpretation 
of . . . Supreme Court doctrine, the oral or written word is ‘pure 
speech’ and is automatically entitled to First Amendment coverage.”27 
Let us very briefly consider the application of the Spence-Hurley test 
to the Facebook “Like” feature.  In its amicus curiae brief before the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, Facebook itself described what hap-
pens when a user “likes” something: 
The “Like” button on Facebook, represented by a thumbs-up icon, is a 
way for Users to share information on Facebook.  The Like but-
ton . . . appears next to many different types of content on Facebook – 
including brands, politicians, religious organizations, charitable causes, 
and other entities that have established a presence on Facebook.  Many 
other (that is, non-Facebook) websites have also incorporated Like but-
tons so that Facebook Users can Like news articles, videos, photos, or 
other content elsewhere on the Internet. 
A Facebook User who Likes content —on or off Facebook —by clicking 
the Like button makes a connection to that content.  By clicking the Like 
button, a Facebook User generates an announcement known as a “Like 
story” that is posted to her Profile (now Timeline) page.  For example, if 
Jane Smith Liked the UNICEF Facebook Page, the statement “Jane Smith 
likes UNICEF” would appear on her Profile page along with the title of the 
Page and an icon selected by the Page’s administrator.  The Page’s title 
and icon function as an Internet link:  another Facebook User who views 
the User’s Profile can click on them and be taken to the Page.  If Jane 
Smith Liked an article on CNN’s website about UNICEF’s activity in sub-
Saharan Africa, the statement “Jane Smith likes this article” would appear 
with a link to the article.28 
 
 24 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
 25 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995). 
 26 Roig, supra note 14, at 334 (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569 (citation omitted)). 
 27 Roig, supra note 14, at 331 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) (“‘[P]ure speech’ . . . , we have repeatedly held, is entitled to 
comprehensive protection under the First Amendment.” (citation omitted))). 
 28 Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 7 at 5–6 (emphasis added and in-
ternal citation and footnote omitted). 
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From this description, it would seem that the use of the “Like” fea-
ture on Facebook would, at least in the ample majority of cases, com-
ply with both requirements of the Spence-Hurley test.29 
First, the operation of the “Like” feature is voluntary.  A user 
chooses to press the “Like” button.30  The operation of this feature is 
not automatic.31  Hence, it would seem reasonable to presume that 
users who press the “Like” button have an intent to convey a message: 
they like a particular post or comment. Furthermore, pressing the 
“Like” button triggers the portrayal of a thumbs-up symbol next to 
the post or comment that the user likes.32  As explained in the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union’s amicus brief in Bland, the thumbs-up sym-
bol is universally recognized as conveying a message of approval.33  In 
addition, the use of the “Like” feature is also commonly understood 
shorthand in the Facebook community for such approval.34  Hence, 
sufficient social conventions would seem to be present in the context 
of the use of the “Like” feature on Facebook to convey a relatively 
clear message that will be understood by those who form part of the 
Facebook community.35 
In fact, it would even seem that consideration of the Spence-Hurley 
test is unnecessary in this situation.  The use of the “Like” feature also 
triggers the display of a message in the written word itself in the form of:  
“[user] likes [post or comment].”  So pressing the “Like” button di-
rectly and foreseeably creates a message in “pure speech.” 
Not surprisingly, the Fourth Circuit court agreed with this analysis 
and reversed the district court’s holding in Bland.36  Nevertheless, it is 
curious to note that the district court in Bland chose not to analyze 
 
 29 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446-49 (2nd Cir. 2001) (conclud-
ing that posting a hyperlink is speech); Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 804–
05 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (concluding that “liking” things on Facebook is “newsworthy”); T.V. 
ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 777 (N.D. Ind. 2011) 
(finding that the posting of photographs to Facebook is protected speech); J.C. ex rel. 
R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (rul-
ing that uploading a video to YouTube is speech protected by the First Amendment). 
 30 Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 7 at 5–6. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Brief for ACLU and ACLU of Virginia as Amici Curiae, supra note 7, at 9. 
 34 Id. (citing One Minute on Facebook, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/video/player/0,
32068,711054024001_2037229,00.html) (“Facebook users understand the meaning of the 
button – so much so that every sixty seconds, there are over 300,000 ‘Likes’ on Face-
book.”) 
 35 Facebook has “[m]ore than a billion monthly active users as of December 2013.” Key Facts 
– Facebook’s Latest News, Announcements, and Media Resources, FACEBOOK, 
http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). 
 36 Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 384–86 (4th Cir. 2013). 
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the Facebook “Like” feature under the Spence-Hurley test at all.  In-
stead, it expressed or hinted at other factors that it believed to be rel-
evant to the analysis.  But why? 
II. WHY THE STRUGGLE? 
The Spence-Hurley test seems equal to its task:  determining wheth-
er a particular activity is communicative enough to merit First 
Amendment coverage.  A problem arises, however, because the 
communicative nature of some particular conduct is not the be-all 
and end-all of First Amendment coverage analysis.  As has previously 
been pointed out, for example, obscenity, so-called fighting words, 
threats, and defamatory speech can all be very communicative; never-
theless, they receive only the most limited First Amendment cover-
age.37 
On the other hand, the regulation of certain activities and things 
that are not communicative themselves will nevertheless surely trigger 
First Amendment analysis. 
The genre of the cinema . . . encompasses far more than speech acts. It 
includes materials, like celluloid; functional machines, like projectors; 
buildings, like movie houses; social organizations, like studios; and so 
forth.  If the state were to prohibit the use of projectors without a license, 
First Amendment coverage would undoubtedly be triggered.  This is not 
because projectors constitute speech acts, but because they are integral 
to the forms of interaction that comprise the genre of the cinema.38 
Pursuant to this line of reasoning, Dan L. Burk describes how the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “something as mundane 
as a newspaper rack might fall into the category of speech-facilitating 
devices,” and trigger First Amendment scrutiny.39  Similarly, the Su-
 
 37 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“This much has been categorically settled 
by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”); Watts v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (“[A] statute such as this one, which makes crim-
inal a form of pure speech, must be interpreted with the commands of the First Amend-
ment clearly in mind.  What is a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally 
protected speech.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (“The present 
advertisement, as an expression of grievance and protest on one of the major public is-
sues of our time, would seem clearly to qualify for the constitutional protection. The 
question is whether it forfeits that protection by the falsity of some of its factual state-
ments and by its alleged defamation of respondent.”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem. These include the . . . ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”). 
 38 Post, Encryption, supra note 13, at 717. 
 39 Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99, 115 (2000) (citing Plain Dealer Publ’g 
Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794 F.2d 1139, 1143 (6th Cir. 1986) (“The right to distribute 
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preme Court has held that the First Amendment prohibition on prior 
restraints extends to “expression or conduct commonly associated with ex-
pression.”40 
When faced with these types of situations, then, the Spence-Hurley 
test proves insufficient to fully respond to coverage questions under 
the First Amendment.  Courts and legislatures appear to be strug-
gling with this insufficiency.  In response, they have attempted to cre-
ate additional hurdles to First Amendment coverage as a proxy for 
eliminating from coverage activities that these courts and legislatures 
might find inconsistent with their conceptions of what the Free 
Speech Clause is meant to protect.  The lack of transparency in these 
value-laden decisions, and the tendency of courts and legislatures to 
depart from clearly established Supreme Court precedent, however, 
is both troubling and inappropriate.41  Let us now consider some ex-
amples. 
III. IN SEARCH OF ALTERNATIVES 
In its struggle with First Amendment coverage doctrine, the dis-
trict court in Bland justified its decision by expressly adopting a more 
stringent standard than the one laid out by the Supreme Court in 
Spence and in Hurley.  Furthermore, the parties in Bland also made 
reference to additional potential requirements for First Amendment 
coverage that the court may have implicitly imposed. 
First, the district court in Bland argued that the use of the “Like” 
feature on Facebook was not substantive enough to constitute speech 
under the First Amendment:  “It is the Court’s conclusion that merely 
‘liking’ a Facebook page is insufficient speech to merit constitutional 
protection. . . . Simply liking a Facebook page is insufficient.  It is not 
the kind of substantive statement that has previously warranted con-
stitutional protection.”42  The district court, then, fashioned a brand 
new “substantiality” or “sufficiency” requirement for First Amend-
ment coverage.  Such a requirement, of course, finds no support in 
Supreme Court precedent.  It should be noted, in this sense, that the 
 
newspapers by means of newsracks is protected by the First Amendment . . . .”), aff’d sub 
nom., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988)). 
 40 Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 760 (1988) (emphasis added). 
 41 For this reason, in a previous article, I proposed a multi-step analytical framework for re-
solving questions of First Amendment coverage.  Roig, supra note 14, at 331–95.  One of 
the central aspects of this proposed framework is precisely the requirement that courts 
make a conscientious and transparent analysis of whether the activity being considered pro-
motes First Amendment values. Id. at 347–95. 
 42 Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 603–04 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
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Supreme Court has found such simple and arguably unsubstantial 
conduct as wearing a black armband,43 wearing a three-word message 
on a jacket,44 saluting or refusing to salute a flag,45 and displaying an 
American flag upside down with a peace symbol attached46 as suffi-
ciently communicative to merit First Amendment coverage. 
A second argument for limiting First Amendment coverage made 
in Bland is based on the allegedly private nature of the activities on 
Facebook.  The defendant in Bland argued that the intended audi-
ence was the plaintiff’s Facebook friends and not the public because 
a message posted on Facebook is viewed by the poster’s friends only.47  
The defendant, however, was “mistaken as a matter of fact.”48  “Each 
Facebook User can select who may view aspects of his or her Profile – 
e.g., Friends, all Facebook Users, or ‘the world at large.’”49  Further-
more, even if the facts were as defendant would have them, the law 
would not be on his side.  “The Supreme Court has held that the First 
Amendment protects the ‘private expression of one’s views . . . .’”50 
 
 43 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 516 (1969) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (“[T]he Court concludes that the wearing of armbands is ‘symbolic speech’ which is 
‘akin to ‘pure speech’’ and therefore protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.”). 
 44 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (“[A]bsent a more particularized and compel-
ling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter ex-
pletive a criminal offense.”). 
 45 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“We think the action of 
the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional 
limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the 
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official con-
trol.”). 
 46 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (“The Court for decades has recognized 
the communicative connotations of the use of flags. . . . On this record there can be little 
doubt that appellant communicated through the use of symbols. The symbolism included 
not only the flag but also the superimposed peace symbol.”). 
 47 Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae, supra note 7, at 17 (“A message posted on Fa-
cebook by a member is viewed by friends only, not the world at large.”). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. (quoting Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412–14 (1979) (rejecting 
the contention that private conversations are beyond the realm of First Amendment pro-
tection)); see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 392 (1987) (asserting that an em-
ployee’s comment made in private conversation was protected by the First Amendment 
and was not sufficient grounds for termination); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 777 
(4th Cir. 2004) (“Love-Lane’s ‘right to protest racial discrimination . . . is not forfeited 
[because she sometimes chose] a private forum.’” (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 
138, 148 n.8 (1982))); Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1330 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Cromer’s 
First Amendment right to voice his concern about racial discrimination in his law en-
forcement agency was clearly established . . . .”); Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 716–17 
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Lastly, the district court in Bland also tried to justify its refusal to 
extend First Amendment coverage to what it appeared to believe was 
a lack of evidence to establish the pertinent intent to convey a partic-
ular message:  “The Court will not attempt to infer the actual content 
of Carter’s posts from one click of a button on Adams’ Facebook 
page.  For the Court to assume that the Plaintiffs made some specific 
statement without evidence of such statements is improper.”51  Here, 
again, the district court appears to have been confused about both 
the facts and the law.  As explained above, there were no mysterious 
inferences to be made here.  Facebook users intentionally press the 
“Like” button, and are well aware of the myriad consequences of such 
action.  Furthermore, as mentioned before, the Supreme Court in 
Hurley specifically clarified that “a narrow, succinctly articulable mes-
sage is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined 
to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message’ would never 
reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music 
of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”52  
Hence, even if the district court was right on the facts (which it was 
not), it would still have been wrong on the law. 
So the district court in Bland struck out.  Its three justifications for 
limiting First Amendment coverage are quite clearly inappropriate.  
This must make one wonder where the district court’s resistance to 
extend First Amendment coverage truly came from, as Supreme 
Court doctrine is not the answer.  Is the problem here a misunder-
standing of that doctrine?  Or is it a deeper misunderstanding, or 
even fear, of a new technology? 
Two other recent litigations also exemplify this trend of courts 
and legislatures attempting to insert new requirements or considera-
tions to First Amendment coverage analysis in the context of emerg-
ing technologies.  In United States v. Stevens,53 the Supreme Court af-
firmed the vacatur of a conviction under a federal statute54 that 
prohibited depictions of animal cruelty.  In this case, the Government 
was arguing that these depictions of animal cruelty should be defined 
out of First Amendment coverage altogether.55  The district court ac-
 
(4th Cir. 1988) (holding that a private lunchtime conversation between employees re-
quired “particularized balancing” to determine First Amendment protection). 
 51 Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
 52 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (in-
ternal citation omitted). 
 53 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010). 
 54 18 U.S.C. § 48 (2006). 
 55 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585 (“The Government argues that ‘depictions of animal cruel-
ty’ . . . ‘lack expressive value,’ and may accordingly ‘be regulated as unprotected speech.’”). 
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cepted the Government’s argument and denied the defendant’s mo-
tion to dismiss the indictment.56  The Supreme Court, however, re-
fused to create a new category of disfavored speech.57 
In this situation, it is hard to think that emerging technologies did 
not play a central role.  The Supreme Court described the relevant 
legislative history: “The legislative background of § 48 focused pri-
marily on the interstate market for ‘crush videos.’  According to the 
House Committee Report on the bill, such videos feature the inten-
tional torture and killing of helpless animals, including cats, dogs, 
monkeys, mice, and hamsters.”58  It is reasonable to imagine that the 
accelerated proliferation of these types of videos due to the easy 
transfer of digital data over the Internet is what brought this matter 
to the forefront of Congress’s agenda.  In this sense, it should be not-
ed that Congress passed the legislation at issue in 1999, right in the 
midst of the so-called “Dot-com bubble.”59  Although in this case the 
preoccupation with technological change is not as self-evident as in 
other cases, again we see Congress and a district court reacting to a 
change in technology in a manner that threatens to undermine First 
Amendment coverage doctrine. 
In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association,60 on the other 
hand, the State of California was transparent in its concern for the 
dangers of new technologies.  In that case, the Supreme Court faced 
a challenge to a state law that imposed restrictions and labeling re-
quirements on the sale or rental of violent video games to minors.61  
“California claim[ed] that video games present special problems be-
cause they are ‘interactive,’ in that the player participates in the vio-
lent action on screen and determines its outcome.”62  On this basis, 
the state argued that this type of video games should be withdrawn 
from First Amendment coverage.63  Hence, the technological changes 
that have allowed for a more immersive experience while playing vid-
eo games provided another tempting opportunity for the expansion 
 
 56 Id. at 1583 (“The District Court denied the motion. It held that the depictions subject to 
§ 48, like obscenity or child pornography, are categorically unprotected by the First 
Amendment.”). 
 57 Id. at 1586 (declining to “carve out from the First Amendment any novel exception for 
§ 48”). 
 58 Id. at 1583 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 106-397, p.2 (1999)). 
 59 Id. 
 60 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 61 Id. at 2732 (“We consider whether a California law imposing restrictions on violent video 
games comports with the First Amendment.”). 
 62 Id. at 2737–38. 
 63 Id. at 2734 (arguing that, like obscenity, violent-speech should not be protected under 
the First Amendment). 
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of the categories of disfavored speech.  The Supreme Court, however, 
again rebuffed the invitation:  “[W]ithout persuasive evidence that a 
novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecog-
nized) tradition of proscription, a legislature may not revise the 
‘judgment [of] the American people,’ embodied in the First 
Amendment, ‘that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government 
outweigh the costs.’”64 
In all of these situations, lower courts, Congress, or the states have 
attempted to constrain the reach of the Free Speech Clause in the 
face of new technologies that threaten particular sensibilities.  In 
their attempts, they have latched on to several different formalistic 
arguments, seeking to expand the requirements necessary for an ac-
tivity to merit coverage under the First Amendment.  Be it the estab-
lishment of a “substantiality” or “sufficiency” requirement, a require-
ment that speech be public and not private, or a heightened 
evidentiary showing of intentionality, on the one hand, or the crea-
tion of new categories of disfavored speech, on the other, all of these 
alternative approaches to constraining First Amendment coverage 
serve as proxies to underlying value judgments being made by these 
state actors.  The Supreme Court has been perceptive in this regard 
and has rejected the invitations to play along, stating:  “new catego-
ries of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legisla-
ture that concludes certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.”65  
“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend 
only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of rela-
tive social costs and benefits.”66 
However, while the Supreme Court is correct in refusing to go 
along with this type of completely ad hoc and non-transparent First 
Amendment analysis, its absolute rejection of a value-based approach 
to these questions is naïve at best, and disingenuous at worst.  If we 
are to be true to the Constitution, we must face the inevitable value 
questions underlying these determinations of First Amendment cov-
erage.  The Supreme Court is correct in stating that “a legislature 
may not revise the ‘judgment [of] the American people,’ embodied 
in the First Amendment, ‘that the benefits of its restrictions on the 
Government outweigh the costs.’”67  However, the Supreme Court’s 
own pronouncements on this issue beg the question:  exactly what is 
that “judgment of the American people embodied in the First 
 
 64 Id. at 2734 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010)). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585. 
 67 Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2734 (2011) (quoting Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1585). 
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Amendment”?  Where is the appropriate balance struck between 
freedom of speech and social costs?  Pursuant to Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s legendary admonishment, only the Supreme Court and 
the judicial department have the final say on what the law is.68  One 
can only hope that the Supreme Court will engage in a conscientious 
and transparent debate regarding the values underlying the First 
Amendment when it engages in such a crucial and delicate balancing 
act. 
IV. THE CASE OF FUNCTIONAL SPEECH 
In the recent past, a similar situation to the ones discussed above 
arose when courts faced the question of whether computer source 
code should be considered speech under the First Amendment.  On 
that occasion, the new arena of debate was the functional nature of 
computer source code. 
Much of the disagreement with respect to the First Amendment 
coverage of source code centered on the question of how coverage is 
affected by source code’s functional characteristics; in other words, by 
the mere fact that source code can be translated and fed into a com-
puter to have it perform a series of tasks.  This disagreement was 
played out in a series of important litigations some years ago.69  Let us 
now look at some of those cases in more detail. 
 
 68 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
 69 See DVD Copy Control Ass’n, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 10 (Cal. 2003) (“[W]e must first 
determine whether restrictions on the dissemination of computer codes . . . are subject to 
scrutiny under the First Amendment. We conclude they are.”); Universal City Studios, 
Inc. v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Executable computer code 
of the type at issue in this case does little to further traditional First Amendment inter-
ests.”); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(“Computer code is expressive.  To that extent, it is a matter of First Amendment con-
cern.  But computer code is not purely expressive . . . . Its expressive element no more 
immunizes its functional aspects from regulation than the expressive motives of an assas-
sin immunize the assassin action.”), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 
273 F.3d 429, 449 (2nd Cir. 2001); Junger v. Daley (Junger I), 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712 (N.D. 
Ohio 1998), rev’d, Junger v. Daley (Junger II) 209 F.3d 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2000) (“The 
functional capabilities of source code, and particularly those of encryption source code, 
should be considered when analyzing the government interest in regulating the exchange 
of this form of speech.”); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State (Bernstein I), 922 F. Supp. 1426, 
1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that expression of ideas translated into machine-readable 
code may still be speech under the First Amendment even though it is purely functional), 
aff’d sub nom. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Bernstein II), 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 
1999), reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Bernstein III), 192 
F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999); Karn v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1996) 
(“[T]he plaintiff alleges that the defendants’ regulation of the diskette violates the plain-
tiff’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech . . . . Upon consideration of the fil-
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A. Instructions, Manuals and DIYs 
The trial court in Bernstein I concluded that “the functionality of a 
language does not make it any less like speech.”70  This holding was 
affirmed in Bernstein II by the Ninth Circuit court:  “[W]e reject the 
notion that the admixture of functionality necessarily puts expression 
beyond the protections of the Constitution.”71 
The Bernstein I court analogized source code to “[i]nstructions, 
do-it-yourself manuals, recipes, [and] even technical information 
about hydrogen bomb construction,” which “are often purely func-
tional,” yet “are also speech.”72  The court here was referring to a se-
ries of cases that have held that publishers cannot be held liable for 
the use of information in publications such as instruction manuals 
and cookbooks.73  Some of these cases, however, are not really First 
 
ings . . . the Court shall grant the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment with re-
spect to the plaintiff’s First . . . Amendment claims.”). 
 70 Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1435 aff’d, Bernstein II, 176 F.3d 1132, reh’g granted and opinion 
withdrawn, Bernstein III, 192 F.3d 1308. 
 71 Bernstein II, 176 F.3d at 1142.  This opinion, however, was then withdrawn and a rehearing 
en banc was granted. Bernstein III, 192 F.3d 1308.  The rehearing en banc never occurred 
due to the amendment of the encryption regulations at issue in the case, which deprived 
the plaintiff of standing. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce (Bernstein IV), No. C 95-
0582 MHP, 2004 WL 838163, at *2 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (“In January 2000, defendants 
added 14 C.F.R. section 740.13(e) to the Federal Register, which allows the DOC to ex-
empt ‘publicly available’ encryption source code from license requirements.  Plaintiff 
amended his complaint in January 2002, alleging that the changed regulations still 
amounted to a prior restraint under the First Amendment. The defendants brought a 
motion for summary judgment on the amended complaint on the grounds that he lacked 
the requisite standing, which this court granted on July 28, 2003.”).  See also Ryan Chris-
topher Fox, Comment, Old Law and New Technology: The Problem of Computer Code and the 
First Amendment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 871, 887–88 (2002) (“On January 14, 2000, however, 
the state of the law changed. The Encryption Administration Regulations were revised to 
allow U.S. companies to ‘have new opportunities to sell their products in the global mar-
ketplace.’ Among other changes, the revisions decontrol encryption software up to and 
including sixty-four bits, and allow unrestricted encryption source code to be released 
without review, provided that the code is not ‘subject to an express agreement for pay-
ment of a licensing fee or royalty.’  The regulations were presumably modified this way in 
order to support the ‘open source’ approach to software development.  The revised regu-
lations also provided for a number of other allowances that eased review of exports in 
other situations.” (quoting Revisions to Encryption Items, 65 Fed. Reg. 2492, 2492 (Jan. 
14, 2000) (codified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 740, 742, 770, 772, 774))). 
 72 Bernstein I, 922 F. Supp. at 1435 (citing United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 
990 (W.D. Wis. 1979)). 
 73 See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1034 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that 
the publisher of a book about mushrooms was not liable to enthusiasts who were poi-
soned by eating mushrooms erroneously identified through use of the book because the 
book’s contents were not products for the purposes of product liability law); Walter v. 
Bauer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822–23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (holding in a case in which a stu-
dent was injured while doing a science project described in textbook that the book was 
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Amendment cases.  Most of them are products liability cases, and the 
question being decided is whether the book’s contents constitute a 
product for purposes of products liability law. 
However, the holdings in some of these cases are based on First 
Amendment concerns.74  In Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, for example, 
the court said, “Were we tempted to create this duty, the gentle tug of 
the First Amendment and the values embodied therein would remind 
us of the social costs.”75  And in Walter v. Bauer, the court reasoned:  
“the danger of plaintiff’s proposed theory is the chilling effect it 
would have on the First Amendment—Freedoms of Speech and 
Press.”76 
None of these cases, however, decisively held that the “instruc-
tions” are covered by the First Amendment or told us why.  Maybe the 
courts in these cases would not have extended strict products liability 
even had they found that the instruction manuals at issue were not 
speech for First Amendment purposes.  The answer is just not clear 
from the opinions.  So these cases are not that helpful to our analysis.  
Nonetheless, it can be argued that if the courts wanted to make an 
exception to First Amendment coverage that was justified by the 
functionality of these types of speech, they would have done so in 
these cases.  Furthermore, the courts seemed to take for granted the 
idea that the First Amendment covers these books. 
But there is, nonetheless, a group of cases that decisively held that 
the First Amendment covers instruction manuals and “how-to” books 
 
not a product for the purposes of products liability law), modified, 451 N.Y.S.2d 533 
(1982); Way v. Boy Scouts of Am., 856 S.W.2d 230, 239 (Tex. App. 1993) (holding that 
“the ideas, thoughts, words, and information conveyed by the magazine and the shooting 
sports supplement [were] not products”); Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282, 284 
(E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding no products liability for a publisher for injury resulting to 
plaintiffs from an explosion while mixing a mordant according to a book on metalsmith-
ing); Cardozo v. True, 342 So.2d 1053, 1057 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that im-
plied warranty on a cookbook did not extend liability to the seller for the material com-
municated by the book); Roman v. City of N.Y., 442 N.Y.S.2d 945, 948 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1981) (declining to hold Planned Parenthood liable for a misstatement in a pamphlet 
about contraceptives); MacKown v. Ill. Publ’g & Printing Co., 6 N.E.2d 526, 530 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1937) (holding that the publisher was not liable for injury caused by a dandruff rem-
edy formula recommended in a printed newspaper). 
 74 See also Jones v. J.B. Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216, 1217–18 (D. Md. 1988) (reasoning 
that to extend liability to a publisher of a medical textbook for injury resulting from a 
remedy described therein “could chill expression and publication which is inconsistent 
with fundamental free speech principles”); Birmingham v. Fodor’s Travel Publ’ns, Inc., 
833 P.2d 70, 75–79 (Haw. 1992) (declining to extend liability to the publisher of a travel 
guide for injury sustained by a reader and quoting extensively from a First Amendment 
case, Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 1263 (1985)). 
 75 938 F.2d at 1037. 
 76 439 N.Y.S.2d at 823. 
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such as the ones at issue in the cases discussed above.  In Alm v. Van 
Nostrand Reinhold Co., Inc., the court held that the First Amendment 
barred the imposition of liability on the publisher of a “how-to” book 
when an individual was injured while following its instructions for 
making a tool.77  Similarly, the court in Smith v. Linn held that the 
First Amendment right to freedom of speech immunized a publisher 
of a diet book from civil liability arising out of the death of a reader 
who followed the diet.78  The last of these cases was actually cited by 
the court in Bernstein I.  In United States v. The Progressive, Inc., the 
court applied First Amendment scrutiny in deciding whether to en-
join the publication of a magazine containing technical information 
on how to construct a hydrogen bomb.79 
These cases show that the court in Bernstein I was correct in hold-
ing that the First Amendment covers instructional manuals and “how-
to” books.  These types of speech are very much like source code in 
the sense that they are highly “functional.”  They are mainly con-
cerned with helping people engage in some activity by providing 
them with a set of instructions that they can follow.  The only differ-
ence is the use of a computer.  The analogy between these types of 
speech and source code is, therefore, quite appropriate, and leads to 
the conclusion that functionality, by itself, does not exclude an activi-
ty from First Amendment coverage. 
B. Navigation Charts 
There is another line of cases similar to the ones described above, 
but which seem to reach the opposite conclusion.  In Brocklesby v. 
United States, the court held that a navigation chart was a product for 
purposes of products liability law.80 “[W]hen inaccurate charts cause 
accidents, courts do not conceptualize suits against the charts’ au-
thors as raising First Amendment questions.”81  But this statement is 
not exactly accurate.  These cases do not really address any First 
Amendment questions at all.82  There is no discussion of the First 
Amendment in any of these cases. 
 
 77 480 N.E.2d at 1264–67. 
 78 563 A.2d 123, 126–27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
 79 467 F. Supp. 990, 996–1000 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
 80 767 F.2d 1288, 1294–95 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 81 Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1254 (1995) 
[hereinafter Post, Recuperating]. 
 82 See Brocklesby, 767 F.2d at 1292 (“The case was submitted to the jury under three theories: 
negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability); Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 
671, 676–77 (2nd Cir. 1983) (applying products liability law in a wrongful death action); 
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Again, all of these cases are strictly products liability decisions.  
This could be interpreted in several ways.  It could mean that these 
courts would not extend First Amendment coverage to these charts. 
But it could also mean that these courts would not extend First 
Amendment protection.  Furthermore, it could simply mean that the 
courts in these cases did not address the First Amendment issues be-
cause the parties did not properly raise them.  As a matter of fact, this 
was exactly the case in Brocklesby.  In that case, the court stated, 
We do not address Jeppesen’s claim that the First Amendment renders the theory 
of strict liability for a defective product inapplicable to published materi-
al such as its charts.  The general rule is that an issue will not be consid-
ered for the first time on appeal.  Since Jeppesen did not raise the First 
Amendment argument at any time below and did not object to the jury 
instructions on strict liability except by implication in summary judgment 
proceedings, Jeppesen has not properly preserved for appeal this objec-
tion to the jury instructions.83 
In any case, these decisions made no First Amendment holding. 
Therefore, they do not constitute good precedent for the proposition 
that the First Amendment does not cover navigation charts.  The case 
of navigational charts is best addressed as an issue of protection, not 
coverage. 
The court in Way v. Boy Scouts of America distinguished the case of 
navigational charts. 84  In general, some courts have held that charts 
are not protected because they “are used for their physical character-
istics rather than for the ideas contained in them.”85  Professor Burk 
argues that source code is more akin to navigational charts than to 
other instructional manuals because code is used like a physical ma-
chine, just like navigational charts are used primarily for their “physi-
cal characteristics.”86 However, it seems more logical that publishers 
of navigational charts were held liable because people rely on these charts. 
“Navigation charts do not receive First Amendment protection . . . 
because we interpret them as speaking monologically to their audi-
ence, as inviting their audience to assume a position of dependence 
and to rely on them.”87 
 
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1981) (deal-
ing with products liability law, reviewing for abuse of discretion by the trial judge, and 
considering due process concerns); Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 170 Cal. App. 3d 468 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (dealing only with issues of strict liability). 
 83 Brocklesby, 767 F.2d at 1295 n.9 (internal citation omitted and emphasis added). 
 84 856 S.W.2d 230, 238–39 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993). 
 85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19 reporters’ n. cmt. d (1997). 
 86 Burk, supra note 40, at 121–22 . 
 87 Post, Recuperating, supra note 82, at 1254. 
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This is similar to the way courts have dealt with consumer product 
safety warnings.  In that case, the courts will also intervene to protect 
consumers “in relationships of dependence or reliance.”88  The courts 
will also deny protection to commercial speech such as product safety 
warnings “because consumers in such contexts are presumed to be 
dependent and justifiably reliant upon the care of manufacturers.”89  
In such “relationships of dependence or reliance requiring legal pro-
tection,”90 the courts will step in because the limited value of the in-
formation being conveyed is outweighed by the threat to innocent 
people in the community. 
The situation with respect to source code is different.  Although 
people might sometimes stake their lives and those of others on the 
content of source code, they do not do so every time they use some 
piece of software.  Programs that run airplane computers might be 
just as heavily relied upon as navigation charts.  But most software is 
not relied upon to this extent.  On the other hand, all navigation 
charts are used in this relationship of extreme dependence and reli-
ance.  Navigation charts are an extreme example of written docu-
ments that do not do very much to further First Amendment values 
and create a situation of great danger when people rely on erroneous 
information that might be included in them.  All navigation charts 
might therefore be excluded, but not all source code should be excluded.  The 
narrow exception that courts might draw for these charts does not 
apply to source code as a whole.  This exception to First Amendment 
coverage (if it were created) would be based on extreme user reli-
ance, not on functionality.  In this case, as we have already seen in 
other contexts, the issue of functionality is being used as a proxy for 
some other underlying concern regarding the lack of furtherance of 
First Amendment values vis à vis a tangible and concrete harm to in-
dividuals.  The issue here is one of reliance, not functionality. 
C. Computer Source Code 
The trial court in Junger I reasoned that 
[s]ource code is “purely functional” in a way that the Bernstein Court’s 
examples of instructions, manuals, and recipes are not. Unlike instruc-
tions, a manual, or a recipe, source code actually performs the function it 
describes. While a recipe provides instructions to a cook, source code is a 
 
 88 Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 23 (2000) 
[hereinafter Post, Commercial Speech]. 
 89 Id. at 23–24. 
 90 Id. at 24. 
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device, like embedded circuitry in a telephone, that actually does the 
function . . . .91 
This is the same argument that Professor Burk makes.  “Far from be-
ing the instruction manual to an intricate and complicated machine, 
computer code is in fact the machine itself.”92 
This argument imbues computer behavior with the inevitability 
that we normally ascribe to fate.  It ignores the fact that source code 
must be compiled and executed before the computer performs any 
functions.  The non-expressive acts of compiling and executing the 
source code can be regulated without regard to First Amendment 
principles.  Even code that does not need to be compiled in the con-
ventional way must be executed before it has any effect.93  The choice 
and act of executing a particular piece of code for nefarious purposes 
in a way that harms others is what can, and should, be regulated. 
Professor Burk’s argument also relies on a formalistic distinction 
between source code and English that is based on the fact that com-
puters can understand and execute compiled source code.  Actually, 
anything can be source code if the compiler is complicated enough.  Just a few 
years ago, the argument could have been made that it was not hard to 
envision computers that would be able to respond to many verbal 
commands in natural language in the near future.  That future, of 
course, is now here.  What used to be a vision is now reality. 
As discussed in a previous article,94 Apple’s inclusion of Siri in the 
iPhone has brought to the mainstream the practice of ordering a 
computer to do things in natural language.95  At present, Siri under-
stands commands in English, Spanish, French, German, Japanese, 
Canadian French, Mandarin, Cantonese, Italian, and Korean.96  
Could this possibly mean that the English language has lost its First 
Amendment coverage, but that the Portuguese language still retains 
it?  Will Portuguese then cease being a fully protected language un-
 
 91 Junger v. Daley (Junger I), 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 717 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (internal citation 
omitted), rev’d, Junger v. Daley (Junger II), 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 92 Burk, supra note 40, at 119. 
 93 Professor Burk talks also about computer languages such as Perl, BASIC, and Java. Id. at 
117 & n.111. These languages do not require compiling in the traditional sense. See id. 
(“Although many computer languages require conversion of the routine to machine-
readable form, some languages are interpreted rather than compiled; that is, the script 
read by a program called an interpreter, which executres pre-designated commands ac-
cording to the script.”). 
 94 See Roig, supra note 14, at 340 n.94 (discussing the First Amendment implications of new 
technology that allows computers to respond to “natural language commands”). 
 95 See Apple – iOS 7 – Siri, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/ios/siri/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2014). 
 96 iOS: About Siri, APPLE, http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4992?viewlocale=en_US&locale=
en_US (last visited Apr. 7, 2014). 
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der the First Amendment and become a functional machine equiva-
lent not covered by the First Amendment at some indeterminate time 
in the future if and when Apple, Inc. sees it fit to release yet another 
polyglot update to the Siri software? 
Of course, Siri is not alone.  The world of computers responsive to 
natural language commands is one of the many areas of technologi-
cal endeavor that is currently experiencing considerable growth.97  
The existence of Siri and other computers responsive to natural lan-
guage commands cannot condemn the English language (or any 
other language for that matter) to the netherworlds of First Amend-
ment invisibility.  The court in Bernstein II was already wise to this log-
ic years before the advent of Siri:  “The fact that computers will soon 
be able to respond directly to spoken commands, for example, 
should not confer on the government the unfettered power to im-
pose prior restraints on speech in an effort to control its ‘functional’ 
aspects.”98 
The question at the heart of this discussion, at the end of the day, 
is whether we should embrace a model of First Amendment coverage 
that limits the worth of our speech (maybe even our thoughts in the 
near future) based on the whims of technological change.  Just like 
ordering another human being to do murder is criminal and punish-
able under current First Amendment doctrine, ordering a computer 
to do evil would likewise be an acceptable subject for regulation un-
der that same doctrine.  We need not relegate the whole of the Eng-
lish language to the nether realms of First Amendment anonymity 
simply because some might choose to make it a tool for their criminal 
enterprises.  Similarly, we need not exclude all computer source code 
from First Amendment coverage because some might choose to run 
pernicious software. 
Arguing that the functional aspects of source code require exclud-
ing all of source code from First Amendment coverage also disre-
gards the expressive aspects of source code that further First 
Amendment values.  In fact, the court in Junger I implicitly recog-
nized the inherent commingling of functional and expressive aspects 
in source code.  After apparently stating that source code was not 
speech covered by the First Amendment, the court went on to apply 
 
 97 See Natasha Singer, The Human Voice, as Game Changer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, at MB NJ 
1 (discussing a series of recent developments and ongoing projects involving voice oper-
ated machines). 
 98 Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of Justice (Bernstein II), 176 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 
1999), reh’g granted, opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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the O’Brien intermediate scrutiny test to the regulations at issue.99  
Technically, then, the court in Junger I held that source code was an 
“expressive means for the exchange of ideas” under O’Brien, and was, 
therefore, subject to First Amendment coverage.100 So even the court 
in Junger I chose to not exclude all source code from any degree of 
First Amendment coverage at all. 
Professor Burk draws an analogy between source code and two ac-
tivities that conveyed specific meaning but that, nonetheless, we 
would probably say should not be covered by the First Amendment.  
He talks about the racially biased bridge designs of Robert Moses, 
who made his overpasses on Long Island expressways low to “pre-
clude low-income public transportation riders—primarily African-
Americans—from reaching Long Island Parks.”101  He also mentions 
the Wang Writer, a word processor that was “designed around certain 
assumptions about the duties and abilities of secretaries,”102 primarily 
women, thereby conveying a male chauvinist point of view.  Professor 
Burk argues that these two things might convey messages, but they 
are primarily functional and therefore not to be considered speech.103  
He then argues that source code is more like these overpasses than 
like a book.104 
But, the reason why we would exclude the overpasses and the 
Wang Writer from First Amendment coverage is not because they are 
functional, it is because they are not communicative enough.  They 
do not pass the Spence-Hurley test.  Not enough social conventions and 
context exist to make it likely enough that very many people would 
understand the message being conveyed.  As Professor Burk argues, 
“one suspects that it is only because the overpasses did not overtly 
communicate racism that they were instantiated in stone . . . .”105  
Source code, on the other hand, is capable of conveying a message to 
those that can read it which is very clear and precise, as we discussed 
previously.  Source code passes the Spence-Hurley test.  The analogy is 
therefore misguided.  This is yet another example of the issue of 
functionality being used as a proxy for the furthering of another hid-
den value, in this case, communication. 
 
 99 Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 721 (N.D. Ohio 1998), rev’ d, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 
2000). 
100 Junger I, 209 F.3d at 485. 
101 Burk, supra note 40, at 113. 
102 Id. at 113–14. 
103 Id. at 114 (“Such functional ‘expression’ appears to lie within the expressive kernel that 
does not rise to the level of First Amendment protection.”). 
104 Id. at 116–21. 
105 Id. at 114. 
May 2014] EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 1257 
 
The court in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes initially argued 
that source code used for facilitating the copying of films in DVDs 
was not covered by the First Amendment because its “expressive as-
pect appears to be minimal when compared to its functional compo-
nent.”106  The court balanced the expressiveness of the source code at 
issue against its functionality and determined that function won 
out.107  “In determining the constitutionality of governmental re-
striction on speech, courts traditionally have balanced the public in-
terest in the restriction against the public interest in the kind of 
speech at issue.”108  However, the cases cited by the court in Reimerdes 
dealt with specific types of disfavored speech.109  We must remember 
that those types of speech are not disfavored because of their functionality.  
There is no mention in such cases of functionality as a disfavored 
quality of speech.  The court in Reimerdes balanced something else en-
tirely, and its reliance on the precedent it cites was misguided. 
I believe it is more likely that the court in Reimerdes was actually 
engaging in the kind of analysis relevant to the issue of First Amend-
ment protection.  In that case, the court’s holding in Reimerdes would 
be completely irrelevant to the question discussed in this Article:  
First Amendment coverage.  In fact, this appears to be the approach 
taken by both the district court itself in an ensuing opinion in the 
same case, and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in an 
opinion affirming the district court.110  Specifically, the circuit court 
held that “computer code, and computer programs constructed from 
code can merit First Amendment protection . . . .”111  The circuit 
court then proceeded to take into account the balance between the 
expressive and functional aspects of the source code at issue when 
analyzing the issue of the scope of protection to be extended to it, and 
the applicable level of scrutiny.112  This is consistent with the conclu-
sion that source code must be deemed covered by the First Amend-
 
106 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 221. 
109 Id. at 221 n.44 (considering Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (dealing with ob-
scenity), Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (deling with privacy), and N.Y. Times v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (dealing with libel)). 
110 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“As 
computer code—whether source or object—is a means of expressing ideas, the First 
Amendment must be considered before its dissemination may be prohibited or regulat-
ed. . . . But that conclusion still leaves for determination the level of scrutiny to be ap-
plied in determining the constitutionality of regulation of computer code.”), aff’d sub 
nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001). 
111 Corley, 273 F.3d at 449. 
112 Id. at 449–53. 
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ment, and that any questions regarding the regulation of its func-
tional aspects must then be analyzed in terms of how much protection 
will be afforded, based on traditional First Amendment doctrine. 
D. Speech Tantamount to Criminal Conduct 
There is one last class of cases in which the functionality of a type 
of speech might be thought of as having something to do with the 
exclusion of it from First Amendment coverage.  In Rice v. Paladin En-
terprises, Inc., the court held that an instructional book on how to be-
come a hit man was not covered by the First Amendment.113  At first 
glance, one might be tempted to think that this holding is premised 
on the functional nature of this instructional manual.  However, this 
case requires more than just functionality for exclusion from First 
Amendment coverage. “[S]peech which, in its effect, is tantamount to 
legitimately proscribable nonexpressive conduct may itself be legiti-
mately proscribed, punished, or regulated incidentally to the consti-
tutional enforcement of generally applicable statutes.”114 As the Su-
preme Court put it, 
It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech 
and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral 
part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. We reject the con-
tention now. . . .  [I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom 
of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the 
conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of lan-
guage, either spoken, written, or printed.115 
It is not the functionality of the speech that excludes it from cover-
age, it is the fact that it constitutes a crime.  “[S]peech is not protect-
ed by the First Amendment when it is the very vehicle of the crime it-
self.”116 
This is also the reason why the First Amendment was held to not 
cover the defendant’s speech in urging the filing of false tax returns 
in United States v. Kelley.117  The same logic was also used by the Ninth 
Circuit court in United States v. Mendelsohn in upholding the convic-
tion of defendants who “knew that [their computer program] was to 
be used as an integral part of a bookmaker’s illegal activity, helping 
 
113 128 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[L]ong established caselaw provides that speech . . . 
that constitutes criminal aiding and abetting does not enjoy the protection of the First 
Amendment”). 
114 Id. at 243. 
115 Giboney v. Empire Storage and Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498, 502 (1949) (citations omitted). 
116 United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970). 
117 769 F.2d 215, 217 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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the bookmaker record, calculate, analyze, and quickly erase illegal 
bets.”118  The court in that case held that the computer program was 
“too instrumental in and intertwined with the performance of crimi-
nal activity to retain first amendment [sic] protection.”119 It was “‘so 
close in time and purpose to a substantive evil as to become part of 
the crime itself.’”120 
These activities, then, were excluded from First Amendment cov-
erage because they were crimes, not because they were functional.  These cas-
es should allay any fears that First Amendment coverage will let pro-
grammers commit all kinds of crimes without being punished.  The 
creation of source code that is so instrumental to criminal behavior 
can still be regulated. And the execution of source code that harms 
others can also be regulated. 
E. Hidden Variables 
We have seen how functionality is not a reason for excluding activ-
ities from First Amendment coverage.  Extreme user reliance, lack of 
communicative value, and the existence of criminal behavior and in-
tent are the things that are at work in all these cases.  Functionality by 
itself is not enough to exclude an activity from the realm of speech.  
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals got it exactly right in Junger II 
when it held that “[t]he fact that a medium of expression has a func-
tional capacity should not preclude constitutional protection. Rather, 
the appropriate consideration of the medium’s functional capacity is 
in the analysis of permitted government regulation.”121  First Amend-
ment “protection is not reserved for purely expressive communica-
tion . . . . The functional capabilities of source code . . . should be 
considered when analyzing the governmental interest in regulating 
the exchange of this form of speech.”122 
This is a question of First Amendment protection, not of cover-
age. We might find that the more functional a particular kind of 
speech is, the more pressing the need for government regulation will 
be.  Whether regulation is justified in a particular case, however, is a 
completely different question, and it is a question that must be an-
swered “by reference to First Amendment doctrine and analysis.”123 
 
118 896 F.2d 1183, 1185–86 (9th Cir. 1990). 
119 Id. at 1186. 
120 Id. (quoting United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1985)). 
121 Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481, 484 (6th Cir. 2000). 
122 Id. at 484–85. 
123 Post, Encryption, supra note 13, at 714. 
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CONCLUSION 
New technologies breed fear.  And fear necessitates a reaction. 
Courts and legislatures are most certainly not immune to reactionary 
tendencies in the face of their own, and society’s, collective fear.  As 
the Free Speech Clause itself teaches us, however, the best antidote 
for fear is a free and open discussion of the causes and solutions rele-
vant to that which makes us afraid.  As we aspire to harness the great 
power that emerging information technologies grant us, we must en-
gage in a conscientious and transparent analysis of the values that 
underlie First Amendment doctrine as we attempt to define, redefine 
and refine the contours of “speech.”  This is the only way of guaran-
teeing that the strictures of the law remain equal to the aspirations of 
our collective spirit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
